Drivers of Foreign Policy

Since the sedate coup that brought the current emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to power in 1995, Qatar has entered into an increasely expanding foreign policy, which has greatly increased the countrys regional and foreign standing. The master(prenominal) give of Qatars foreign policy is its fictional character as mediator and negotiator in a function of conflicts in the bosom eastern United States and elsewhere, for role model in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories, Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen. In each case, Qatar prided itself on engaging with warring factions to moil for semipolitical settlements or rapprochement, as well as providing humanitarian assistance.The decisions administration Qatars participation in such conflicts atomic number 18 very central. The main decision-makers are the Emir, His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Prime Minister and international Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Al-Thani. Restricting much o f the decision-making of this small round has quickly led to foreign (and local) policy decisions, al modesting Qatar to respond quickly to rising conflicts with mediation offers.While it can be said that drawing a picture of the country as a benefactor is a domain diplomatic move by Qatar since neutrality facilitates the consolidation of credibility among triplex audiences there are deeper sources behind Qatars expansionist approach to mediating the conflict by expanding its foreign policy.The first motive is to maintain its security and stability. Qatar is located in the Arabian Peninsula, an area full of political and military rivalries. By increasing its international standing, Qatar aims to protect itself from the dangers of non-disclosure of small and vulnerable states 5 risks of the type suffered by Kuwait in 1990. 6 In addition, by engaging in mediation between conflicting factions such as Houthis and the Yemeni government.Or between Hezbollah and its allies on the one hand and the present 14 bloc on the other, Qatar can be seen as arduous to contain those conflicts and prevent their spread closer to home. This inevitability becomes more penetrative when one considers the role Iran plays in those conflicts and in the Gulf in particular. Iran is the main backer of Hezbollah and has established links with the Huthis in Yemen and a number of Shiite movements in the Gulf.Qatar also shares the largest oil field in the world with Iran, and is amply aware of Irans expansionist foreign policy objectives in the region. By arduous to mediate between non-Iranian actors and their rivals, Qatar is trying to counter Iranian influence in the Middle East in general, and more specifically in the Gulf, plot of ground maintaining friendly relations with Iran. Thus, in addition to general security concerns, Irans role in the region can be seen as a unclutter driver behind Qatars mediation of the Middle East conflict.The third motive for Qatari mediation i s the desire to expand its influence as a regional player, especially in the face of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has traditionally played a leading role in conflicts throughout the region, for example during the Lebanese civil war. However, in recent years Saudi mediation has been spoiled for perceived neutrality, making the Kingdom an active player preferably than a neutral intermediary.The close relationship between Saudi Arabia and the blemish 14 political bloc in Lebanon, led by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, is an example. Qatar therefore viewed a vacuum in the Arab international relations it was trying to bridge. Its involvement in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond is an effort to present itself as a vital alternative to Saudi Arabia and a potential new leader in the Middle East.This role was further enhanced by Qatars membership of the United Nations security department Council in 2006-2007, during which the Emirate increased its regional mediation and assi stance activities. However, Qatar was keen non to exceed the limits of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Despite Qatars view of Saudi Arabias low influence in the Middle East (in addition to the growing Iranian influence, which adds to the urgent need for regional Arab leadership), the country remains cautious not to conflict with the kingdoms domestic and foreign policies.Thus, when the Bahraini uprising began in 2011, Qatar back up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) led by Saudi Arabia mission to quell the insurgency. 7 When the Yemeni uprising, which began in the same year, gained momentum, Qatar also supported the GCC initiative it managed.The runway of transition in Yemen, leading to a negotiated transition instead of overthrowing the governance of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although Qatars relationship with Saudi Arabia over the years has been turbulent, it has finally reached a rapprochement in 2008 and has continued to become more entrenched, driven by Qatari realism and th e Emirates awareness of the limits of its influence in the Gulf.Saudi Arabia is the dominant political power in the Arabian Peninsula, where Qatar has not yet had the opportunity or the ability to play the first major role. Both countries share concerns some the instability and political transition that are reaching their territory, which leads them to cooperate more than confrontation.